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Introduction 
The air pollution control program is the crown jewel of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency that often 
develops “the state of the art” in regulation generally.1 Officially called 
the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR),2 the air program has achieved 
most of the public health benefits3 of our five-decade-long crusade to 
 
†  E. Donald Elliott is the Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor at Yale Law 
School and a Distinguished Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s 
Antonin Scalia School of Law. He was the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Assistant Administrator and General Counsel from 1989–1991. 
1. See The Clean Air Act: Solving Air Pollution Problem with Science and 
Technology, EPA, https://epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-
solving-air-pollution-problems-science-and-technology [httsp://perma.cc/ 
 G42X-XP38] (last updated May 28, 2020) (explaining that the EPA uses 
“state-of-the-art analyses” to implement the Clean Air Act).  
2. See About the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR), EPA, 
https://epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-air-and-radiation-oar [https:// 
 perma./cc/SFXY-Y5PS] (last updated May 5, 2020).  
3. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–2020, the Second 
Prospective Study, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/ 
 benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-2020-second-prospective-study [https:// 
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“save the planet.” It is time to undertake a sober assessment of both 
strengths and weakness of air-pollution regulation to learn lessons for 
future regulatory programs. 
To its credit, the OAR has made measurable progress in reducing 
every type of air pollution it has targeted. The main features of the 
U.S. system of regulating air pollution—“cooperative federalism,”4 
notice and comment rulemaking, benefit–cost analysis, and citizens’ 
suits—were all innovations in 1970 when the effort began; today, they 
are proven regulatory techniques. While the system has been expensive, 
it has achieved significant progress and credibly claims benefits to 
public health and productivity many times its costs. 
On the negative side, the United States’ method of regulating air 
pollution has been criticized as slow and inefficient.5 As discussed below, 
in some instances it has required thirty years or more to achieve the 
EPA’s objectives.6 These long delays are, in the main, not the EPA’s 
fault. They result in part from the method of regulation mandated by 
Congress, which relies on the EPA’s compiling an extensive scientific 
record, followed by public-notice-and-comment rulemaking, judicial 
review by generalist judges, state implementation, and finally, enforce–
ment, primarily through civil litigation.7 This system of rulemaking, like 
everything made by humans, has its strengths and weaknesses. On one 
hand, the EPA has been remarkably successful over a generation at 
using its interpretive “Chevron discretion”8 to cope with structural 
weaknesses that were built into the program by Congress from its 
inception, such as “grandfathering” existing plants and using states as 
the primary units for implementation while many air pollution problems 
are regional in their nature. The U.S. system of regulation takes a long 
time to implement, but eventually it generates specific air-pollution 
limits that are verifiable and enforceable for the thousands and 
 
 perma.cc/5582-WZ3X] (“In 2020, the Clean Air Act Amendments 
will prevent over 230,000 early deaths. Most of the economic 
benefits (about 85[%]) are attributable to reductions in premature 
mortality associated with reductions in ambient particulate matter.”) 
(last updated Jan. 4, 2017). 
4. Cooperative Federalism at EPA, EPA, https://epa.gov/home/cooperative-
federalism-epa [https://perma.cc/92A9-36RR] (last updated June 1, 2020).  
5. See infra Part II.B. 
6. See infra Part II.B.  
7. See infra Part II.B.   
8. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984) (holding that administrative agencies are entitled to 
“deference” where Congress did not decide the issue and “the regulatory 
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the manner in a 
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling 
conflicting policies”).  
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thousands of major sources of air pollution of multiple types, which 
greatly enhances enforceability.9 
On the negative side, the OAR has generally been reluctant to use 
monetary incentives in addition to command-and-control rules to 
regulate polluters. This is partly cultural, but it also results from an 
unfortunate misunderstanding of the EPA’s authority to impose “user 
fees” for use of the atmosphere for waste disposal.10 While many of the 
advantages of economic-incentive systems have been touted in the 
academic literature, including cost savings and stimulating innovation,11 
it has generally not been recognized that the economic incentives to 
reduce pollution created by either tradeable permits or user fees take 
effect immediately, while command-and-control rules typically take 
years to roll out. Moreover, once a source has a command-and-control 
limit in place, it has little or no incentive to reduce pollution below the 
legal limit and may even be reluctant to develop new techniques that 
it would then have to apply as “best available control technology” at 
its other locations. 
This Article suggests that in the future the OAR, and the EPA 
generally, should consider charging user fees to create incentives to 
reduce pollution in addition to setting maximum pollution limits.12 It is 
hard to imagine that at this late date Congress would substitute either 
tradeable permits or emissions fees for the existing system of regulatory 
limits; however, in order to speed up the pace of reductions in air 
pollution, it might be attractive politically to enact a provision giving 
polluters the option to opt out of the existing system of command-and-
control regulation, with all of its regulatory red tape and delays, if they 
cut their existing pollution permitted under the current system by a 
significant amount, such as 10–25%, and paid an emissions fee on the 
pollution that they continue to emit.13 Because such a system would 
both reduce pollution and cut red tape, it might even be possible to 
enact it on a bipartisan basis. In some limited instances, the EPA might 
even be able to do something like this under its existing statutory 
 
9. E. Donald Elliott, U.S. Environmental Law in Global Perspective: Five 
Do’s and Five Don’ts from Our Experience, 5 Nat’l Taiwan U. L. Rev. 
144, 147 (2010). 
10. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
11. See Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic Incentives in 
Environmental Regulation, 8 Yale J. Reg. 463, 468–69 (1991).  
12. See E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s Existing Authority to Impose a Carbon 
“Tax”, 49 Envt’l L. Rep. News & Analysis 10919, 10921 (2019) 
(arguing that the EPA has existing statutory authority under the 
Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 137-376, 65 
Stat. 268, to impose “user fees” for releases of air pollution into the 
public’s air). 
13. See infra p. 30. 
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authority to approve an “alternative equivalent program” under Section 
172(e) of the Clean Air Act.14 
I. EPA Regulation of Air Pollution Has Achieved 
Measurable Progress. 
The OAR has led a revolution in public health and well-being. To 
those who did not live through this transformation of our air, it is hard 
to imagine. When I first moved to Washington, D.C. in the mid-1960s, 
the smog was so thick that I could not see across the street. Breathing 
the acrid air burned inside your nose and hurt your lungs; today, that 
never happens in Washington, and is rare elsewhere. The photo below 
compares New York’s air in 1973 (on the left) and 2013 (on the right).15 
 
Two-thirds of our population lives in areas that meet all of the 
EPA’s minimum air-quality standards, but about one-third (roughly 
137 million people) live in areas that still violate one or more of them.16  
However, the standards today are more stringent; overall, the air is 
definitely getting cleaner, but more work remains to be done. 
Some criticize the EPA’s air-pollution record, but in the main, they 
are constructive critics who argue that we could have done better.17 
Overall, however, almost everyone agrees that regulation of air 
 
14. See Memorandum from Stephen Page, Dir., Off. of Air Quality Planning 
& Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, Regions I–X, at 2 (Jan. 
5, 2010) (arguing that EPA has authority to adopt an “equivalent 
alternative program” under Section 172(e)), available at https://www.epa 
 .gov/ground-level-ozone-pollution/guidance-developing-fee-programs-
required-clean-air-act-section-185 [https://perma.cc/KT6A-MFDQ].   
15. History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, 
EPA, https://epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/ 
 accomplishments-and-success-air-pollution-transportation [https://perma.cc/ 
 YU7B-6JSA] (last updated Jan. 23, 2020). 
16. Air Quality—National Summary, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-
trends/air-quality-national-summary [https://perma.cc/WM2Q-9X8R] (last 
updated July 8, 2019).  
17. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
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pollution is one of the major successes of federal policy in the twentieth 
century. 
The EPA has racked up many impressive achievements in reducing 
in air pollution, including: 
• eliminating lead from gasoline;18  
• promulgating and progressively reducing national ambient-
air-quality standards (NAAQS), requiring states to reduce 
dramatically the concentrations of six ubiquitous pollutants 
in the air, primarily from factories and power plants burning 
fossil fuels;19  
• phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and (HCFCs), which 
were damaging the ozone layer;20  
• reducing significantly air pollutants from automobile tailpipes 
and motor fuels;21 and 
• requiring over 140 categories of industry to install technology 
to control emissions of toxic air pollutants.22 
The agency itself reports major air-quality improvements: 
Between 1990 and 2017, national concentrations of air pollutants 
improved 80[%] for lead, 77[%] for carbon monoxide, 88[%] for 
sulfur dioxide (1-hour), 56[%] for nitrogen dioxide (annual), and 
22[%] for ozone. Fine particle concentrations (24-hour) improved 
 
18. Prohibition on Gasoline Containing Lead or Lead Additives for Highway 
Use, 61 Fed. Reg. 3832, 3832 (Feb. 2, 1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).  
19. See Criteria Air Pollutants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-
pollutants [https://perma.cc/9FLE-4DXY] (last updated Mar. 8, 2018).  
20. Phaseout of Ozone-Depleting Substances (ODS), EPA, https://www.epa 
 .gov/ods-phaseout [https://perma.cc/U5VH-K69Z] (last updated Jan. 16, 
2020).  
21. See Regulations to Reduce Mobile Source Pollution, EPA, https://www 
 .epa.gov/mobile-source-pollution/regulations-reduce-mobile-source-pollution 
[https://perma.cc/CRA6-6YJF] (last updated Mar. 20, 2017).  
22. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAP), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/ 
 national-emission-standards-hazardous-air-pollutants-neshap-9 [https:// 
 perma.cc/N3BL-V7ME] (listing examples of regulatory requirements) 
(last updated Oct. 15, 2019).   
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40[%] and coarse particle concentrations (24-hour) improved 
34[%] between 2000 . . . and 2015.23  
This progress in reducing ubiquitous air pollutants, primarily from 
burning fossil fuels in power plants and factories and pollution controls 







23. Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People’s Health, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-
improving-peoples-health [https://perma.cc/M5DY-NZXS] (last updated 
Aug. 14, 2019).  
24. Joel Schwartz, Facts Not Fear on Air Pollution, Nat’l Ctr. for Pol’y 
Analysis (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.ncpathinktank.org/pub/st294?pg=3 
[https://perma.cc/ R4W5-RALM].  
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These reductions in air pollution were achieved without stifling 
economic growth, as is shown in the chart below.25 
 
The air program also pioneered innovations including “cap and 
trade” programs, such as the 1979 “bubble” policy and the 1990 acid 
rain-trading program, which achieved a 50% reduction of sulfur oxide 
pollution from electric utility power plants at a fraction of the cost of 
conventional command-and-control regulation.26 
But at the same time, the U.S. system of regulating air pollution 
has been criticized by the friendly critics as slow, complex, and 
legalistic.27 Many of the successful air-pollution-control programs took 
twenty years or more to reach fruition.28 In addition, the economic costs 
are high, with federal air-quality policies costing an estimated $80 
 
25. Air Quality—National Summary, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/ 
 air-quality-national-summary [https://perma.cc/WM2Q-9X8R] (last 
updated July 8, 2019).  
26. Executive Summary—The Clear Skies Initiative, The White House 
(Feb. 14, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
 releases/2002/02/clearskies.html [https://perma.cc/M7BA-CJDY] (“The 
acid rain cap and trade program created by Congress in 1990 reduced 
more pollution in the last decade than all other Clean Air Act command-
and-control programs combined, and achieved significant reductions at 
two-thirds of the cost to accomplish those reductions using a ‘command-
and-control’ system. . . . The Acid Rain program enjoys nearly 100[%] 
compliance and only takes 75 EPA employees to run—a track record no 
command-and-control program can meet.”). 
27. See infra Part II.B. 
28. See infra Part II.B. 
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billion (in 2010 dollars) annually.29 But most of this money is in the 
form of transfer payments to buy goods and services, such as pollution-
control equipment, so it is not a dead weight loss on the economy. These 
expenditures produce benefits far in excess of the costs: the EPA 
estimates that the quantifiable benefits, primarily in improving human 
health and reducing premature mortality, are thirty to ninety times 
greater than the costs.30 Most of these benefits come from reducing the 
airborne concentrations of very small particles from burning fossil fuels 
called “particulate matter.”31 These tiny particles lodge in the lungs and 
have been shown in epidemiological studies to reduce life span compared 
to people who live in areas with cleaner air.32 There are debates about 
the EPA’s estimates of huge health benefits from air-pollution 
reductions, but virtually everyone concedes that the benefits have 
exceeded the costs; it is just a question of by how much.33 
The approach of the air program, like  most of the EPA’s other 
programs, is a variation of the style of lawmaking described by the 
eminent sociologist Robert Kagan as “bureaucratic legalism,” a term he 
borrowed from Max Weber.34 There are, however, three important 
additions to classic Weberian bureaucracy: (1) broad rights of public 
participation, (2) rights of affected citizens to go to court to require the 
government to initiate or enforce regulation, and (3) judicial review by 
generalist judges.35 Elsewhere I have praised these added features as 
among the best features of the American system of environmental law 
and I advocated that other countries should consider adopting some or 
all of them;36 but they also have substantial costs as well as benefits, 
 
29. Michelle L. Bell et al., Quantifying the Human Health Benefits of Air 
Pollution Policies: Review of Recent Studies and New Directions in 
Accountability Research, 14 Envt’l Sci. & Pol’y 357, 357 (2011).  
30. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–2020, the Second Prospective 
Study, supra note 3. 
31. Id. 
32. Ambient (Outdoor) Air Pollution, WHO (May 2, 2018), https://www 
 .who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-and-
health [https://perma.ccPJP4-HA2U]. 
33. See, e.g., Cong. Research Serv., R44840, Cost and Benefit 
Considerations in Clean Air Act Regulations, at ii (2017) (“The 
estimated benefits of CAA regulations rely heavily on the effects of 
reducing particulate emissions, and on the value placed on the avoidance 
of premature death as a result of such controls.”), available at https:// 
 www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170505_R44840_2d99a4fb88ed12a2fd82
2422e7356175cc9c148e.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLE3-6U4E]. 
34. Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of 
Law 12 (2d ed. 2019). 
35. See generally Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012). 
36. See Elliott, supra note 9. 
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primarily in terms of their potential to delay regulatory action, as I 
discuss below.37 
The air program promulgates binding legal rules, primarily through 
a process called notice-and-comment, or informal, rulemaking. That 
process notifies the public of a proposed rule or rule change and gives 
it a chance to submit written comments about those proposals. The 
EPA must then respond in writing and on the public record to 
significant comments, explaining why it did or did not change the draft 
rule in response to the comments. Both the written comments and the 
EPA’s responses form part of the record for judicial review. 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has existed since 1946, but its use 
was greatly expanded in the early 1970s when courts began to allow 
agencies to develop legally binding regulatory standards using notice-
and-comment, rather than trial-type, procedures.38 Before the expansion 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, it is virtually impossible to imagine 
a federal regulator, such as the OAR, with the capacity to impose limits 
on the discharges of various types of pollutants from hundreds of 
different types of industrial processes at thousands of plants throughout 
the country, to establish binding legal norms; federal regulatory 
agencies simply did not have the necessary information-processing 
capacity.39 Thus, the expansion of federal regulatory authority over air 
pollution was made possible by the expansion of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, which enabled the government to develop 
specific, enforceable limits on individual polluting facilities. 
The air program also issues “guidance documents.”40 These 
documents give advance notice of the positions that the agency is likely 
to take in enforcement litigation. The public does not routinely get a 
chance to comment on guidance documents as they do on rules, but at 
least in legal theory, guidance documents are not binding upon persons 
outside the agency.41 Still, if one wants to avoid the risk and expense of 
 
37. See infra Part II.B. 
38. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 
(1973); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 149 (2d ed. 1984) 
(noting that, during the 1970s, the “center of gravity” of government 
policymaking shifted into the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.) 
The use of administrative rulemaking to impose binding legal requirements 
continues to be controversial in some quarters. See generally Philip 
Hamburger, The Administrative Threat (2017). 
39. See Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 
Regulation, July–Aug. 1981, at 25, 26–27. 
40. Significant Guidance Documents—Air, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/significant-guidance-documents-air [https:/perma.cc/XA8M-
9W48] (last updated June 4, 2020). 
41. See McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1322, 1324 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that regulated parties must be allowed to 
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litigation, one pays close attention to the safe harbors that the EPA 
provides through guidance and disregards them only at the peril of 
facing an EPA-enforcement suit. 
Both rules and the application of guidance to a particular situation 
are subject to judicial review. Those who can sue include not only 
affected industries and states that contend that EPA has required too 
much,42 but also citizens’ groups43 and companies and states that feel 
that EPA has done too little.44 The opportunity for citizens, 
environmental groups, and companies that favor more stringent 
regulation to go to court to force the agency to do more does not exist 
in most other countries. In addition, citizens and states, as well as the 
EPA, can also sue to enforce the rules already on the books.45 Both 
types of litigation are called “citizens’ suits,” although they are of two 
different types. Elsewhere I have argued that such citizens’ suits are 
one of the best features of U.S. environmental law and should be 
emulated by other countries.46 But like judicial review generally, they 
also impose costs in both money and time. 
II. The Critics Argue We Could Have Done Even 
Better. 
Despite the EPA’s progress in cleaning up the air, which is 
objectively measurable and thus hard to deny, a number of critics, 
particularly in the academy, do mount limited critiques of the air 
 
challenge guidance when it is applied because it is non-binding policy 
rather than a legislative rule); Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 
41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1468 (1992) (discussing rules that bind only the 
government body that made them versus those that bind the entire 
public); Notice of Administrative Conference of the United States’ 
Adoption of Recommendation 2017-5: Agency Guidance Through Policy 
Statements 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,734 (Dec. 29, 2017) (providing a list 
of available administrative documents and recommendations, and 
explaining the importance of agency guidance through policy statements).  
See generally Robert Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind 
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 17 (1990) (complaining 
that some guidance documents are binding as a practical matter). 
42. Jeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of 
Federal Pollution Control Laws 17–18 (1987). 
43. Id. at 19–20. 
44. Id. at 18.  
45. Elliott, supra note 9, at 152.  
46. Id. 
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program.47 Most of them, including my own,48 are speculative, quali–
tative, and ultimately friendly, in the sense that they merely 
hypothesize that we might have done even better (or faster, or with less 
expense) if we had done something differently.49 That is not surprising, 
as most legal academics consider it their mission to speculate about how 
public policy might be improved.50 
For example, in Professor Peter Schuck’s epic assessment of the 
successes and failures of U.S. domestic policy since World War II,51 he 
does not rank the EPA’s air program as an unqualified “success.” I 
questioned Peter about this omission, and he explained that it was 
because he thought that it had been too expensive.52 But of course, that 
assessment is hypothetical; we do not have access to an alternative 
universe in which the same progress in reducing air pollution was 
achieved at lower cost by doing something different. 
A more strident critic is David Schoenbrod, a Trustee Professor at 
New York University Law School and a former litigator for the Natural 
Resources Defense Council. In a blog post on the fortieth anniversary 
of the EPA’s establishment, Professor Schoenbrod argued the “the 
Clean Air Act is in no shape to be celebrated”: 
It is appropriate to celebrate past successes, but in truth the 
Clean Air Act cannot handle today’s pollution problems, and not 
just those caused by greenhouse gases. EPA has found that 
traditional pollutants continue to harm public health, but the 
Clean Air Act, a statute passed in 1970 during the dawn of 
environmentalism, mandates an ineffective, inefficient response: a 
requirement that each state adopt its own plan to control 
 
47. See generally id. 
48. Id. at 160–65; E. Donald Elliott, The Case for Trimming the EPA, The 
Atlantic (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/ 
 2012/03/the-case-for-trimming-the-epa/254701 [https://perma.cc/FC8S-
XDD8]. 
49. See Elliott, supra note 9, at 160–65.  
50. For example, Milton Friedman, the winner of the Nobel Prize for 
economics in 1976, once wrote: 
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When 
that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas 
that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function [as 
academics]: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep 
them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes 
politically inevitable. 
 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, at ix (2d ed. 1982). 
51. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often: 
And How It Can Do Better  (2014). 
52. Personal communication with Professor Peter Schuck. 
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emissions. Congress should replace the state plan requirement 
with federal market-based regulation.53 
I share David’s concern that, to date, the air program has been 
unable to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that will survive judicial 
review or win bipartisan political support.54 And I also share his belief 
that greater reliance on economic incentives would be desirable,55 
although I believe we should integrate economic incentives with tradi–
tional command-and-control regulation, not replace the existing system 
entirely.56 
David goes on to identify three specific problems with the air 
program but it is notable that all three can be laid at the doorstep of 
Congress, not the EPA: 
The assumptions behind that 1970 scheme no longer hold true. 
First, Congress assumed back then that each state’s pollution 
came almost entirely from smokestacks within that state and, on 
that basis, required each state to adopt a formal plan to cut 
pollution. Experience has shown, however, that much pollution 
comes from other states and even other nations. Yet, the state 
plan requirement remains the Clean Air Act’s major program.  
Second, Congress assumed in 1970 that the best way to control 
pollution was for the state plan to tell each big factory what to 
do. This top-down approach worked well enough when industries 
had yet to install well-known, relatively inexpensive control 
devices. Today it is far less obvious how to eke out further 
progress. To cut pollution further often requires changes in the 
industrial processes themselves, changes in small businesses, 
buildings, and other small sources, and changes based on 
innovation still being worked out. Regulators writing state plans 
today cannot know enough to pick the most effective and efficient 
ways to further reduce pollution. Yet, the state plan requirement 
continues.  
Third, Congress assumed in 1970 that each state would design, 
implement and enforce a plan sufficient to meet federal 
environmental targets. The result has been an overwhelmingly 
complex and disappointingly ineffective program. According to a 
2004 National Research Council study, the state plan requirement 
 
53. David Schoenbrod, The Clean Air Act Is in No Shape to Be Celebrated, 
Huffington Post (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
 david-schoenbrod/the-clean-air-act-is-in-n_b_704631.html [https://perma 
 .cc/7MNC-AL6U]. 
54. See infra Part II.A. 
55. See infra Part II.C. 
56. See infra Part II.C. 
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is “legalistic,” “often frustrating” and “probably discourages 
innovation.” It “overtaxes the limited financial and human 
resources available” and “draws attention and resources away 
from the more germane issue of ensuring progress.” Yet, the state 
plan requirement continues.57  
Schoenbrod’s critique is largely focused on a single part of the Clean 
Air Act: the system for setting federal National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) under sections 108 and 109 of the Act, which are 
mandatory minimum health and welfare-based median quality 
standards that states must then develop SIPs (for “state 
implementation plans”) to achieve “attainment and maintenance” 
under section 110.58 It is true that in the 1970s and into the 1980s the 
system of NAAQS and SIPs was the mainstay of federal air-quality 
regulation.59 But over time, the EPA has gradually issued a large 
number of technology-based federal regulations that apply directly to 
major sources of pollution, called New Source Performance Standard 
(NSPS) and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAPs) under sections 111 and 112 of the Act.60 In retrospect, the 
state-based SIP system appears to have been a transitional strategy 
between traditional state-based regulation of air pollution and greater 
federal regulation. 
Others have argued persuasively that Congress made a serious 
mistake in only applying these technology-based federal standards to 
“new” or “modified” plants (a policy they call “grandfathering”) and 
that an approach more like that of the Clean Water Act—gradually 
phasing-in federal technology-based standards to existing as well as new 
plants—would have been better.61 As discussed below,62 the EPA 
eventually used its interpretive and enforcement authority to try to 
correct this mistake by Congress, but it has taken a long time and that 
job is still not complete. The fact is that Congress did not know in 1970 
which regulatory techniques would work best to combat air pollution, 
so it gave the EPA a variety of tools to use, although I argue below 
that the tools most conspicuous by their absence were economic 
incentives, such as emissions fees or tradeable permits.63 Schoenbrod’s 
 
57. Schoenbrod, supra note 53.  
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–10 (2012). 
59. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2019) (discussing the development of 
NAAQS and SIPs, and grounds for their later revision).  
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411–12 (2012). 
61. Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Struggling for Air: Power 
Plants and the “War on Coal” 24–54 (2016). 
62. See infra Part II.B.2. 
63. See infra Part II.C. 
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claim that the NAAQS/SIP system should have been eliminated as 
more direct federal technology-based regulation was phased in is more 
debatable. Compliance with technology-based standards does not 
necessarily eliminate so-called “hot spots,” where health-based limits 
are exceeded due to a concentration of pollution sources in a particular 
area despite compliance with technology-based standards.64 
But if an overriding lesson emerges from Schoenbrod’s critique, it 
is that largely due to a legislative “logjam”65 created by the lack of 
bipartisan support for most environmental legislation since the 1992 
election,66 Congress has largely been absent in the environmental area 
and has not made any significant additions or changes to the Clean Air 
Act since 1990. This has left the EPA to fend for itself, which has 
created or exacerbated the following three basic shortcomings for the 
air program. 
A. The Failure of Comprehensive Federal Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gases 
This is not the place to debate the science of climate change, or 
what role human use of fossil fuels and other activities play in causing 
it.67 For present purposes, it suffices to note that in 2007, the Supreme 
 
64. See generally Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and SO2 Hot Spots—Good 
News from the Acid Rain Program, 31 Envtl. Rep. 954–59 (2000) 
(explaining pollution “hot spots”). 
65. See David Schoenbrod et al., Breaking the Logjam: Environmental 
Protection That Will Work (2010); see also E. Donald Elliott, Portage 
Strategies for Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a Logjam 
Era, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 24 (2008). 
66. See E. Donald Elliott, Politics Failed, Not Ideas, 28 Envtl. F., Sept.–
Oct. 2011, at 42, 42–43.  
67. I respectfully disagree with much of Professor Carlson’s encomium to the 
history of regulation of automobile emissions and her endorsement of the 
Green New Deal in this symposium. In both cases, her argument is a “one-
handed clap,” in the sense that she does not consider alternatives to either 
what occurred in regulating automobiles or how the Green New Deal 
proposes to address climate change. Like Professor Carlson, I favor 
ambitious goals and timetables. But what the ambitious goals are also 
matters, and she gives scant consideration to that. Elsewhere I have 
argued that the commitment in the Green New Deal to phase out all fossil 
fuel use makes little sense. See E. Donald Elliott, What’s Really Wrong 
with the Green New Deal, The Spectator (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:05 AM), 
https://spectator.org/whats-really-wrong-with-the-green-new-deal/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/NZ2S-J73X]. It is an example of a common fallacy that I have 
named the “process reversal fallacy”: if one thinks that climate change 
was caused by too much fossil fuel usage by human beings, it is intuitively 
appealing but it does not follow logically or automatically that the proper 
remedy is to eliminate fossil-fuel usage. See id. Rather, as I point out in 
that article, the solution is going to be a cost-effective combination of 
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Court held that the EPA should regulate climate change under the 
Clean Air Act unless it could either determine that anthropocentric 
emissions were not contributing significantly to climate change or 
provide some other valid reason for not regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs).68 In response, in December 2009, the EPA finalized 
an “endangerment finding” that GHGs were in fact contributing to 
climate change.69 Despite some public expressions of doubt about the 
extent of human contributions to climate change by President Trump,70 
to date the Trump Administration has not revoked the endangerment 
finding that commits the EPA to regulating GHGs. 
And yet, in the thirteen years since Massachusetts v. EPA71 was 
decided, the EPA has not managed to develop a comprehensive 
program to address GHGs that will withstand judicial and political 
review. The Waxman–Markey bill to create a trading system for GHGs, 
modeled on the successful acid rain-trading system under the 1990 
Clean Air Act amendments, passed the House, but was never brought 
up for a vote in the Senate because, even though the Democrats had a 
filibuster proof sixty vote majority at the time, it still would not have 
passed.72 As President Obama neared his last year in office, his 
 
reducing fossil fuel usage, adaptation, removing carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, add on pollution controls to remove carbon dioxide from 
exhaust streams, and possibly, geo-engineering. See id. More sophisticated 
observers of climate change policy, including Mike Vanderburgh and 
Jonathan Gilligan, who are also contributors to this symposium, recognize 
in their fine book on the role of private governance in fighting climate 
change that there is no one single policy that is the magic “silver bullet” 
but that is going to take a whole portfolio of policies and initiatives to 
achieve climate policy goals. See Michael P. Vandenbergh and 
Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Politics: The Private Governance 
Response to Climate Change 14 (2017). 
68. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007). 
69. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
70. See, e.g., Trump Says Climate Change Not a Hoax, Not Sure of Its Source, 





 OLEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/5H3K-LXFM].  
71. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. 
72. See generally John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy 
Policy of Choice, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 2010/03/26/science/earth/26climate.html (describing the political history 
of the Waxman–Markey bill’s demise) [https://perma.cc/K3QY-FB8J]; 
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administration finally promulgated a “clean power plan” that would 
have required future administrations to force states to take regulatory 
action a few years later to reduce GHGs from existing fossil-fuel-fired 
power plants.73 But the same Supreme Court that only a few years 
earlier had pushed the EPA to address climate change took the highly 
unusual action of issuing a stay of that regulation on the grounds that 
those challenging the plan had a probability of success on the merits of 
their challenge that the regulation went beyond the EPA’s authority 
under the statutory section in question.74 The Trump Administration 
agreed, and revoked the Clean Power Plan.75 
Without getting into a blame game as to who is responsible for the 
failure of the air program to address climate change successfully, that 
omission must be counted as a shortcoming, particularly because it 
contrasts with other successful initiatives to address air pollution that 
did command broad bipartisan support. For example, the 1990 Clean 
Air Act amendments, which created the successful trading program to 
address acid rain on a regional basis and strengthened other sections of 
the Act, including those relating to air toxics, were passed by a vote of 
401–21 in the House of Representatives and 89–11 in the Senate.76 
B. Getting It Right Can Take a Generation 
Even for matters on which the EPA’s air program does eventually 
get it right and accomplish its air-pollution-control objectives, the 
American system of regulating air pollution through “bureaucratic 
 
Sam Zacher, For The Fire This Time: Lessons from Waxman-Markey, 
The Trouble (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.the-trouble.com/content/ 
 2018/8/22/for-the-fire-this-time-lessons-from-waxman-markey [https:// 
 perma.cc/S9E6-VPWU]. 
73. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). See generally Tomas Carbonell, 
EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health 
by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S. Power Sector, 33 Yale L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 403 (2014) (arguing that the Clean Power Plan represented 
a sensible approach from a policy perspective if one were writing on a 
clean slate rather than implementing a statutory provision that was not 
written with climate change in mind). 
74. Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, U.S.S.C. No. 15A773 (Feb. 
9, 2016). 
75. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to 
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 
8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
76. Clean Air Act Overview: 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary, 
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-
amendment-summary [https://perma.cc/F6XV-Q2ZR] (last updated Jan. 
3, 2017). 
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legalism,” and in our case with add-ons of extensive opportunities for 
public participation and political and judicial review,77 often takes a 
generation or more. This is not to contend that the benefits of judicial 
review or public participation are not worth the costs, but only to 
observe that there are costs, not merely benefits, that must be weighed 
in the balance.78 
Three examples illustrate the point that the American approach to 
air pollution regulation often takes a very long time to achieve its goals. 
1. Eliminating the Lead from Gasoline 
One of the air program’s greatest success stories from a public-
health perspective was eliminating the lead from gasoline; however, it 
took almost exactly twenty-five years from the time of the EPA’s 
original proposal to the consummation of this noble mission. 
In the 1970s, 90% of gasoline in the United States contained 
tetraethyl lead as an octane booster to prevent high-compression 
engines from “knocking” and to lubricate the metal-to-metal contact in 
the cylinders.79 Environmental problems occurred because lead is not 
destroyed during the combustion of gasoline; instead, small particles of 
lead are released from the tailpipe and accumulate along roadways, 
particularly in urban areas.80 High levels of lead have been known for 
many years to be a neurotoxin, and recent research has shown that 
even low levels of lead in the blood can decrease a person’s IQ, result 
in hyperactivity disorder, and cause a variety of other adverse health 
effects.81 At the time that the EPA began requiring the oil companies 
to remove lead from gasoline, no other known additive could replace it, 
but the agency was confident that something could be developed, and 
it turned out to be right. 
The saga of removing lead from gasoline began shortly after the 
signing of the Clean Air Act, when in January 1971, the EPA 
announced that it was considering promulgating a rule to decrease the 
levels of lead in gasoline and to require refiners to sell at least one grade 
 
77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
78. But see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial 
review of Agency Action, 1989 Duke L. J. 522 (1989) (cataloguing the 
benefits of judicial review). 
79. See Gil Oudijk, The Rise and Fall of Organometallic Additives in Automotive 
Gasoline, 11 Envtl. Forensics 17, 17, 26 (2010) (explaining the history 
behind the use of tetraethyl lead in order to avoid the premature 
detonation of fuel). 
80. See, e.g., S.R. Craxford, Pollution from Lead in Petrol, 1 Oil & 
Petrochemical Pollution 285, 289 (1983). 
81. Lead, Nat’l Inst. Envtl. Health Sci., https://www.niehs.nih.gov/ 
 health/topics/agents/lead/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/8ZQ3-QFYS] (last 
reviewed Dec. 18, 2019).  
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of unleaded gasoline.82 In a sense, this was low-hanging fruit because 
lead fouled and destroyed the effectiveness of catalytic converters that 
were used to capture other pollutants in automobile exhaust;83 but the 
proposal was also based on lead’s adverse health effects. The EPA 
finalized that rule in 1973, and simultaneously proposed a schedule to 
further decrease the lead content of fuels, but to do so gradually and 
with significant exceptions.84 Small refiners were exempted entirely from 
the first-step decrease in 1975, but were subject to the second step in 
1979.85 
In a precursor of what would later become the bubble policy and 
cap-and-trade programs, refiners were allowed to “pool” their leaded 
and unleaded gasoline, so that if they produced more unleaded gasoline, 
they could use their fixed allotment of lead to produce some gasoline 
with a higher lead content.86 The logic was that this gave refiners 
flexibility to find the most cost-effective mix for them to comply with 
the new restrictions, while holding constant the total amount of lead 
released into the environment. Such a strategy works only because the 
environmental harm results from the total amount of lead released to 
the environment, not from how much lead is contained in any particular 
gallon of gasoline. 
The lead-phase-down rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit and 
upheld in a five–four en banc decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,87 “a classic 
in administrative law.”88 The key issue was not whether high levels of 
lead in the blood were damaging, but whether the low levels of lead 
contained in gasoline were actually causing harm as opposed to other 
more significant sources, such as lead paint. Lead is heavy, so it settles 
to the ground rapidly, and it was not thought at the time that lead was 
inhaled to any significant degree; rather, the EPA’s legal theory was 
that children could get lead dust that was deposited at the curbside 
from auto exhaust on their hands and then put their hands into their 
mouths, causing them to ingest lead. This pica theory was, frankly, 
speculative, and the EPA had no direct proof that lead from gasoline 
was actually causing any significant harm. 
 
82. Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36 Fed. Reg. 1486, 1486 (proposed Jan. 30, 
1971) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 479). 
83. Id. 
84. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1254 (Jan. 10, 
1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).   
85. Id. at 1260.  
86. Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,739 (Dec. 
6, 1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
87. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).  
88. Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental 
Regulation, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 943, 949 (1994). 
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Nonetheless, in a majority opinion by Judge J. Skelly Wright that 
prefigures the Chevron doctrine of deferring to administrative 
constructions of ambiguous statutory terms,89 the five–four majority 
accepted the EPA’s argument that the statutory “will endanger” 
standard was “an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than a 
factual determination, balancing the relative risks of under-protection 
as compared to overprotection,” and therefore was not to be reviewed 
with the rigor customary for questions of fact.90 While Ethyl has never 
been explicitly overruled, later cases, including Supreme Court cases, 
have not always followed its wise lead that the quantum of science 
required to justify regulation is a policy decision rather than an ordinary 
question of fact.91 
The decisive vote in Ethyl was cast by then-Chief Judge David L. 
Bazelon, who confided to his law clerk that while the EPA might not 
be able to prove that the lead from gasoline was in and of itself having 
significant adverse effects on health, it was “too early” in the 
development of environmental science to demand such proof.92 Plus the 
risks of stunting the growth and intellectual development of children in 
urban ghettos were unacceptable and justified erring on the side of 
protecting public health.93 In this Chief Judge Bazelon and the en banc 
majority anticipated the precautionary principle that, in the words of 
the 1992 Rio Treaty, “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
 
89. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
90. Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 20, citing inter alia Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 
722, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Where . . . regulations turn on choices of 
policy, on an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters 
on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will demand adequate reasons 
and explanations, but not ‘findings’ of the sort familiar from the world of 
adjudication.”).  
91. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 662 (1980) (remanding OSHA benzene standard for failure to make 
a factual finding of a “significant risk” to health); see also Gail Charnley 
& E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and 
Public Health Protection, 32 Envtl. L. Inst.: News & Analysis 10,363, 
10,363–64 (2002) (criticizing Industrial Union Dep’t, supra, on the 
grounds that “by conceiving of risk assessment as fundamentally an issue 
of fact, [the decision] subordinates policy considerations . . . [b]y 
overemphasizing the factual component of risk assessment . . . [and] 
misunderstand[s] the nature of risk assessment”). 
92. Personal communication.  
93. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at Fifty and a Suggestion 
for How It Might Do Even Better 
914 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”94 
Research that became available after the Ethyl decision showed a 
significant decline in the levels of lead in the blood of urban children 
after the EPA’s regulations went into effect, although a definitive link 
between the two could not be established.95 More recent research has 
also shown that, contrary to what was known at the time of the Ethyl 
decision, “[i]nhalation is the second major pathway of exposure [to lead] 
for the general population in the United States.”96 That is an important 
lesson from the episode: environmental toxins are only rarely shown to 
be less hazardous than initially suspected, but they frequently turn out 
to be more hazardous as more, better-designed research is done that is 
able to detect harm at lower levels of exposure that were previously 
thought to be safe. Past experience in detecting harm at lower and 
lower levels counsels in favor of a precautionary approach when the 
scientific literature is not yet mature. On the other hand, the dilemma 
for regulators is that when precautionary regulation is implemented 
based on early evidence suggesting a possible problem, it is difficult to 
change regulation later without provoking the accusation that one is 
“rolling back” environmental protections.97 This is why the Ethyl court 
was wise in holding that the quantum of evidence needed to justify 
regulation is a policy decision. 
The EPA’s success in Ethyl in 1976 was not the end of the story, 
however. In the wake of the Arab Oil embargo and the energy crisis in 
the mid-1970s, the EPA came under political pressure and extended the 
original 1979 deadline for phasing down the lead content of gasoline 
until 1982.98 During the regulatory reform initiatives of the Reagan and 
first Bush administrations, the lead phase down again came under 
 
94. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992); see also Communication from the Commission 
on the Precautionary Principle, at 10, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb 2, 2000); 
Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle, 23 Pace 
Envtl. L. Rev. 21, 25 (2006). 
95. See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 
527–28 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (summarizing results of the CDC’s Second 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey). 
96. Oscar Tarragó & Mary Jean Brown, Agency for Toxic 
Substances & Disease Registry, Lead Toxicity 39 (2017), available 
at https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=34&po=6 [https:// 
 perma.cc/5GDW-2RRM]. 
97. See Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in The Reality 
of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the United States 
and Europe 223, 223 (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011). 
98. McGarity, supra note 88, at 949–50. 
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attack, and the EPA again compromised temporarily.99 But eventually, 
on January 1, 1996, the EPA’s total ban on lead in gasoline became 
effective, almost exactly twenty-five years after it had first been 
proposed.100 Most of the world eventually followed EPA’s lead. While 
the Europeans were a decade behind the United States in removing lead 
from gasoline, by the mid-2000s, almost every country in the world had 
followed the U.S. example and banned the sale of leaded gasoline.101 
Getting the lead out of gasoline was a very good decision in 
retrospect from a public health perspective;102 however, it took twenty-
five years to complete.103 Some say that the lesson is that environmental 
regulation is more likely to succeed against entrenched economic 
interests when it is accomplished gradually through a series of steps and 
compromises. For example, EPA Administrator Michael Leavitt 
maintained “[t]here is no progress to be made at the extremes. Progress 
can only be made in the productive center.”104 But the step-by-step 
approach can take a very long time, as the removal of lead from gasoline 
illustrates. 
2. Ending Grandfathering of Existing Plants 
Former N.Y.U. Law School Dean Richard Revesz and his co-author, 
Jack Lienke, have argued persuasively in their book, Struggling for 
Air,105 that one of the most questionable legislative decisions in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 was the decision to regulate existing 
plants less stringently than new plants, often called “grandfathering.” 
Regulating future polluters more stringently than those already 
 
99. See id. 
100. Id. 
101. Benjamin Elisha Sawe, Countries That Still Use Leaded Gasoline, World 
Atlas (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-
that-still-use-leaded-gasoline.html [https://perma.cc/Q7K5-9XT2]. 
102. Nick Wilson & John Horrocks, Lessons from the Removal of Lead from 
Gasoline for Controlling Other Environmental Pollutants: A Case Study 
from New Zealand, 7 Envtl. Health 1–2 (2008).  
103. Timeline of Major Accomplishments in Transportation, Air Pollution, and 
Climate Change, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-
and-climate-change/timeline-major-accomplishments-transportation-air 
[https://perma.cc/SU6U-TFU9] (“EPA completes its 25-year mission to 
completely remove lead from gasoline. Lead is banned from gasoline as of 
January 1, 1996.”) (last updated Jan. 10, 2017). 
104. Michael Janofsky, Nominee for E.P.A. Defends His Job as Utah 
Governor, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 
 08/14/us/nominee-for-epa-defends-his-job-as-utah-governor.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/2A7F-SEPR]. 
105. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Struggling for 
Air: Power Plants and the “War on Coal” (2016). 
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operating often happens because it is less difficult politically to impose 
costs on speculative future projects than on existing industries that are 
organized and have political clout. But the decision in 1970 to 
grandfather polluters out of the stringent air-pollution requirements 
that would apply to new or modified sources was also taken because it 
seemed intuitively obvious to the drafters that it would be less 
expensive to design pollution-control equipment for a new plant than 
to retrofit an existing plant.106 They also thought that plants would 
retire automatically after about thirty years (not realizing that industry 
estimates to that effect were based on the IRS’s depreciation schedule, 
and that some plants continue to operate for fifty years or even 
longer).107 
But the intuitively obvious is not necessarily valid, and it turns out 
that installing pollution controls on most old plants is really not much 
more difficult or expensive than incorporating them into the designs for 
new ones, although an existing plant will typically have a shorter 
remaining useful life over which to amortize the capital costs of 
installing pollution-control equipment. But this factual error by the 
drafters led to a significant policy problem by creating strong incentives 
to keep older, dirtier sources online longer because they were cheaper 
to operate. 
The pollution controls required on a new electric power plant (a 
“scrubber” or flue gas desulfurization) are expensive, often costing tens 
of millions of dollars.108 Exempting existing power plants from the 
stringent pollution-control requirements that applied to new plants 
created a cost differential so that electric utilities in competitive 
markets had strong incentives to keep their older, dirtier plants online 
longer.109 
 
106. Personal Communication with Roger Strelow (the EPA’s First Assistant 
Administrator for Air and Waste), who was also involved in drafting the 
1970 amendments. 
107. Id.  
108. There is a surprising dearth of published information about the cost of 
scrubbers. One academic article published in 1988 estimated the capital 
cost of controlling the fifty largest electric utility sources of sulfur oxide 
pollution at $20 billion, or approximately $40 million per plant (in 1986 
dollars). See William D. Baasel, Capital and Operating Costs of Wet 
Scrubbers, 38 J. Air Pollution Control Ass’n 327–32 (1988). The 
cost, however, depends on the size of plant being controlled, and some 
claim that costs have come down by about 30% due to advances in 
technology in recent years. See Scrubber Myths and Realities, Power 
Engineering (Jan. 1, 1995), https://www.power-eng.com/1995/01/01/ 
 scrubber-myths-and-realities/#gref [https://perma.cc/8VUE-FFYM]. 
109. See Cleaner Power Plants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/mats/cleaner-
power-plants [https://perma.cc/2CV4-SLPZ] (describing existing control 
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This unintended consequence was eventually corrected not by 
statutory amendment but by an aggressive litigation strategy led by 
the EPA’s top air-enforcement attorney at the time, Bruce Buckheit, 
and his allies at environmental-advocacy organizations, such as John 
Walke at the Natural Resources Defense Council and Vickie Patton at 
the Environmental Defense Fund.110 They filed enforcement cases first 
against the largest coal-fired electric power plants in the Midwest—
winning billion-dollar settlements to install new, state-of-the art 
pollution-control scrubbers on older coal-fired power plants—and later 
against several other industries. In all, over 100 “new source review” 
(NSR) enforcement cases were filed, almost all of which were eventually 
settled with the polluters agreeing to install new pollution-control 
technology. 
The EPA’s legal theory was that these power plants and other 
plants had been violating the law for many years by failing to apply for 
prevention-of-significant-deterioration (PSD) permits which would 
have required them to install the “best available control technology” 
that was already required of their newer counterparts. Several of the 
largest utility systems in the Midwest—Ohio Edison, Tennessee Valley 
Authority, and the American Electric Power company—settled these 
NSR cases by agreeing to install advanced pollution-control 
technology.111 But one utility, Duke Power, litigated all the way to the 
Supreme Court, where they lost in a unanimous decision.112 
The issue in the NSR cases was the meaning of the following phrase 
in the EPA’s regulations triggering PSD review: “any physical change 
in or change in the method of operation of a major stationary source 
that would result in . . . a significant net emissions increase.”113 At the 
time, the regulations also contained an exemption for “routine 
maintenance, repair, and replacement,” but the EPA came up with the 
clever theory that if a plant was breaking down frequently, and thus 
was only able to operate part of the time, there was an “increase in 
emissions” if it were repaired and was then able to operate more of the 
 
technologies to address toxic pollutants from power plants) (last updated 
Mar. 4, 2019).  
110. Dateline: Clearing the Air, (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4759864/ns/dateline_nbc/#.X 
 oN9vS2ZPUp [https://perma.cc/Q92L-4AN9]. 
111. U.S. Announces Settlement of Landmark Clean Air Act Case Against 
Ohio Edison, Dep’t of Just. (March 18, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/ 
 archive/opa/pr/2005/March/05_enrd_129.htm [https://perma.cc/XMZ7-
7FJP]. 
112. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 581–82 (2007). 
113. 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987). 
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time.114 This debate about which repairs were “routine” and which were 
not also led to arcane arguments about whether, when repairing an 
older plant, a company had to use “like-kind” components or whether 
it could upgrade the broken parts with more modern equipment.115 
When the NSR controversy finally reached the Supreme Court, the 
Court boiled down the issues to whether the EPA could define an 
increase in emissions on an hourly basis for the purposes of one section 
of the statute (NSPS under section 111), but use a different annual 
metric instead for an emissions increase for PSD purposes under a 
different section of the statute (section 165).116 Sometimes, to state the 
question is to answer it; the Supreme Court made short work of that 
argument, holding that a word could have one meaning in one section 
of the statute and a different meaning in another.117 
But like the lead-in-gasoline saga, the issue did not go away after a 
single EPA win in court. NSR has continued to be controversial, and 
as recently as December 7, 2017, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt 
issued a controversial guidance document making technical changes for 
how emissions increases are measured for PSD purposes.118 Part of the 
underlying problem with the PSD program is that a plant has to apply 
for a PSD permit before making the physical or operational changes in 
question, so no one knows in advance exactly what its emissions will be 
after the change.119 The EPA originally addressed this problem by 
comparing the plant’s actual emissions before the change with its 
“potential” emissions after the change, assuming the plant would 
operate at full capacity, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, if it 
had the legal right to do so under its permit.120 This is a conservative 
worst-case approach because few, if any, sources of pollution actually 
operate all of the time at full capacity. 
Controversy surrounded the efforts of the second Bush 
Administration, led by the OAR’s Assistant Administrator, Jeff 
Holmstead, to substitute a comparison of a plant’s projected actual 
emissions after a physical or operational change with its actual 
 
114. Id. § 51.66(b)(2)(iii)(a), (f)(1)(iii). 
115. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 917 (7th Cir. 1990). 
116. Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 570. 
117. Id. at 573–74. 
118. Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt, Administrator, EPA, to Regional 
Administrators 6 (Dec. 7, 2017), available at https://www.environmentallaw 
 andpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/452/2017/12/policy_memo.12.7 
 .171.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZLR-KER3].  
119. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 309 n.1 (2014). 
120. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 916. 
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emissions before the change.121 Eventually, however, after notice-and-
comment rulemaking and litigation, the comparison of past actual 
emissions to projected future actual emissions was substituted for the 
potential-emissions test, along with 105 pages of fine print containing 
other technical policy changes.122 These technical changes made it easier 
for most sources of air pollution to modify their operations without 
triggering PSD review or the accompanying obligation to install best 
available control technology. Nevertheless, controversy continues to 
surround the NSR program to this day.123 
Eventually the EPA largely got rid of grandfathering existing 
plants out of stringent new technology-based standards by 
interpretation and enforcement litigation,124 which is arguably good 
from a policy perspective. But this policy change took a very long time, 
and the battle still continues today because the law was being changed 
by both court and agency interpretations with little or no participation 
by Congress. 
3. The Long Struggle Against Inter-State Air Pollution 
One of the strongest arguments for federal, as opposed to state, 
regulation of air pollution is that air pollution does not respect state 
boundaries.125 Ironically, however, combatting these so-called “spill-over 
effects” from one state to another has proved to be one of the most 
recalcitrant air-pollution problems. 
Despite Schoenbrod’s claim that in 1970 Congress “thought” most 
air-pollution problems were local,126 the 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendments contained two provisions specifically designed to combat 
inter-state air pollution: section 110(a)(2)(D)127 (the so-called “good 
 
121. Art Fraas et al., EPA’s New Source Review Program: Time for Reform?, 
47 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,026, 10,034–35 (2017). 
122. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New 
Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-
Future-Actual Methodology, Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean 
Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,185, 80,188 (Dec. 31, 
2002) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 51 & 52). 
123. Fraas et al., supra note 121, at 10,039. 
124. EPA, Fact Sheet: Implementation of the New Source Review 
(NSR) Program for Particulate Matter Less Than 2.5 
Micrometers (PM2.5)—Final Rule to Repeal Grandfather 
Provision 1–2 (2011).  
125. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2341, 2375 (1996); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 625–26 (1996). 
126. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2012). 
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neighbor provision”), and section 126.128 Under the former, the EPA is 
not supposed to approve a state’s implementation plan if it permits a 
pollution source to cause or contribute significantly to a violation of the 
NAAQS in another state.129 Under the latter, a state may petition the 
EPA to set emissions limits for specific out-of-state sources of air 
pollution that significantly contribute to the nonattainment of or inter–
ference with maintaining one or more NAAQS in the petitioning state, 
and the petitioning state may go to court if the EPA fails to do so.130 
Unfortunately, neither section proved effective, largely because it is 
very difficult to prove that air pollution originating in one state is 
causing particular violations of the NAAQS in another state, which is 
sometimes called the issue of “attribution.”131 
In the 1990 amendments, Congress set up a process of regional 
consultations in a thirteen-state Ozone Transport Region (OTR) in the 
mid-Atlantic and East Coast states from Virginia to Maine, which were 
collectively out of compliance with the NAAQS for ozone.132 The hope 
was that the states could reach mutual agreements to reduce pollution, 
and that this would become a model for other regional collaborations. 
The states in turn set up an “Ozone Transport Commission,” a 
voluntary organization that shared technical information among the 
states and advised the EPA, but lacked any actual regulatory 
authority.133 While these consultations among the states in the OTR 
produced some coordinated actions and memoranda of understand–
ings134 to both reduce emissions from existing sources within the OTR 
and take other coordinated actions, the group ultimately had to petition 
the EPA to ratchet down emissions from eight upwind Midwest states 
that it contended were contributing over half of the ozone pollution in 
 
128. Id. § 7426. 
129. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(1). 
130. Id. § 7426. 
131. See Kate C. Shouse, Cong. Research Serv., R45299, The Clean 
Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision: Overview of Interstate Air 
Pollution Control 2 (2018) (describing the contribution to ozone 
violations in downwind states of emissions originating in upwind states); 
Treatment of Data Influenced by Exceptional Events, 81 Fed. Reg. 
68,216, 68,225 n.17 (Oct. 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 
51) (identifying attribution as a component in analyzing violations). 
132. Clean Air Act § 184(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2012). 
133. OTC Process, Ozone Transport Comm’n, https://otcair.org/OTC_ 
 process.asp [https://perma.cc/Y72A-LEH6] (last visited June 5, 2020). 
134. Memorandum of Understanding Among the States of the Ozone Transport 
Commission on Development of a Regional Strategy Concerning the Control 
of Stationary Source Nitrogen Oxide Emissions (Sept. 27, 1994), available 
at https://otcair.org/upload/Documents/Memorandums/att2.htm [https:// 
 perma.cc/A94M-AG3N].  
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the OTR.135 When the EPA denied that petition, the OTR states went 
to court, where the matter is still pending.136 
The EPA’s efforts to control another aspect of the interstate-
pollution problem involving the oxides of nitrogen (NOx), a precursor 
for ozone formation, led the EPA in 1998 to issue a “NOx SIP call,” 
requiring twenty-two states and the District of Columbia to reduce 
their emissions of NOx by approximately 50% without attribution of 
particular violations to particular individual pollution sources.137 That 
action was largely upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 2000,138 over a vigorous 
dissent by Judge Sentelle, who argued that the EPA should not have 
considered “cost effectiveness” in deciding whether emissions in one 
state contribute significantly to non-attainment in a downwind state.139 
By 2005, it had become clear to the EPA that the 50% reduction from 
the Clinton-era NOx SIP call would not be sufficient to bring the 
downwind states into compliance,140 so under the Bush Administration, 
the EPA issued the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR),141 which would 
have required a 70% reduction in NOx from twenty-eight states, as well 
as reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxides, which contribute to fine-
particulate pollution.142 That rule was also challenged in the D.C. 
Circuit, but this time it was held to be “fundamentally flawed” on 
grounds very similar to those in Judge Sentelle’s previous dissent: 
namely, that the EPA should not have considered cost effectiveness in 
 
135. Petition to the United States Environmental Protection Agency for the 
Addition of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia to the Ozone Transport Region 
Established Pursuant to Section 184 of the Federal Clean Air Act as 
Permitted by Section 176A of the Federal Clean Air Act (Dec. 9, 2013), 
available at https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/air_pdf/otrpetition1213.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6G7-SXS5]. 
136. See Sonal Patel, Eight States Sue EPA, Arguing Ozone Transport Region 
Decision Is “Unlawful”, Power (Dec. 28, 2017) https://www.powermag 
 .com/eight-states-sue-epa-arguing-ozone-transport-region-decision-is-
unlawful/ [https://perma.cc/9PZ5-AKXF]; see also Response to December 9, 
2013, Clean Air Act Section 176A Petition from Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island and Vermont, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,238 (Nov. 3, 2017). 
137. EPA, Fact Sheet: Final Rule for Reducing Regional Transport 
of Ground-Level Ozone (Smog) and Two Related Proposals 1–
2, 7 (1998). 
138. Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
139. Id. at 695. 
140. Shouse, supra note 131, at 16. 
141. Id. 
142. Res., Sci., & Indus. Div., Cong. Research Serv., RL32927, Clean 
Air Interstate Rule: Review and Analysis 1 (2005). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
A Critical Assessment of the EPA’s Air Program at Fifty and a Suggestion 
for How It Might Do Even Better 
922 
making the threshold determination that emissions in one state cause 
or contribute to violations of the NAAQS in another state.143 Strangely, 
however, while remanding the rule to the EPA for reconsideration, the 
court left major parts of it in effect in the meantime.144 The Obama 
Administration then superseded the Bush Administration’s 70% 
reductions with 71% reductions across twenty-seven states in the 2011 
Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR).145 That rule was finally 
upheld by the Supreme Court in 2014, where the Court held that it was 
permissible to considering cost effectiveness in deciding whether a state 
causes or contributes to violations of pollution standards.146 
In short, almost fifty years after Congress had mandated the EPA 
to reduce emissions in states that were causing or contributing to 
violations of air-pollution standards in other states, and twenty-two 
years after the EPA got serious about addressing the issue in the 1998 
NOx SIP, the agency finally got clearance from the courts to begin 
making states actually revise their SIPs to impose such reductions by 
attributing particular violations to particular sources—only to have the 
EPA make further revisions to CSPR in 2016.147 The D.C. Circuit then 
reviewed and remanded those revisions in 2019—this time for being too 
lenient on the upwind states.148 
The point is that the regulatory system under the Clean Air Act 
has a great many “moving parts,” which provide numerous oppor–
tunities for judicial challenges and delays. Are the benefits of any 
particular court decision worth the costs? I do not know, but it has 
been fifty years and counting and we still have not eliminated the 
problem of inter-state air pollution, which, as David Schoenbrod rightly 
noted ten years ago, accounts for a significant portion of the non–
attainment problem.149 This experience contrasts sharply with the acid 
rain training program mandated by Congress in the 1990 amendments, 
which used economic incentives and actually achieved a 50% reduction 
 
143. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 929–30 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
144. Id. at 930. 
145. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate 
Matter and Ozone Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48, 208 
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97).  
146. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014). 
147. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS, 81 
Fed. Reg. 74,504 (Oct. 26, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 78, 
and 97).  
148. Wisconsin v. EPA, 983 F.3d 303 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
149. Schoenbrod, supra note 53. 
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in emissions of sulfur oxides from electric generating units in the twenty 
years from 1990 to 2010.150 
C. Under Reliance on Economic Incentives 
A final shortcoming of the Clean Air Act is the conspicuous absence 
of economic incentives to supplement command-and-control regulation 
in the EPA’s tool box. This is ironic because at the dawn of the 
environmental era, the Nixon Administration proposed to address 
sulfur-oxide pollution through a sulfur-oxides tax.151 The EPA, however, 
has generally been allergic to charging polluters for the right to 
pollute,152 insisting instead on giving away for free the right to pollute 
while limiting the amount of pollution that can be released. It is 
axiomatic in economics that when you charge for something, you get 
less of that thing than when you give it away for free.153 
An extensive academic literature argues in favor of greater use of 
economic incentives to protect the environment,154 and I will not  
150. See Pub. L. No. 101-541, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(2012)); Acid Rain Program: Overview, EPA, http://epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
 acid-rain-program [https://perma.cc/EM4A-XKAF] (last updated Dec. 
18, 2019).  
151. E. W. Kenworthy, Nixon to Seek Tax on Sulphur Oxides Emitted by 
Industry, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 1972), http://www.nytimes.com/1972/02/ 
 09/archives/nixon-to-seek-tax-on-sulphur-oxides-emitted-by-industry-nixon-
to.html [https://perma.cc/Z3FQ-W3AH]; see also John C. Whitaker, 
Striking a Balance: Environmental and Natural Resource Policy 
in the Nixon–Ford Years (1976) (explaining the rationale for 
important environmental policy). 
152. Bruce A. Ackerman & Donald Elliott, Air Pollution ‘Rights’, N.Y. Times 
(Sept. 11, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/11/opinion/airpollution-
rights.html [https://perma.cc/77R4-B33Q] (“The E.P.A. should, instead, 
sell polluters the right to dirty the air for a fixed period—just as the 
Government now auctions off oil and gas leases to the highest bidders. If 
polluters were forced to pay, they would clean up to avoid the cost—and 
breathers, not industry, would profit. The public would not stand for a 
multibilliondollar give-away of public lands or water to industry. Why 
should the air be different?”); see also Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 
19 Pace Envtl L. Rev. 515 (2002) (discussing public ownership of 
natural resources).  
153. Al Ehrbar, Supply, Libr. of Econ. & Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/ 
 library/Enc/Supply.html [https://perma.cc/VT5Q-KTGZ] (“the law of 
demand . . . says that the quantity of a good demanded falls as the price 
rises”) (last visited June 5, 2020). 
154. See, e.g., John H. Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices (1968); 
W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution 
Control Programs, 5 J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972); Bruce A. Ackerman 
et al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (Free 
Press, 1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985); see also Hugh 
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rehearse those arguments here. Nor will I venture into the internecine 
warfare between the proponents of tradeable rights and proponents of 
emissions charges.155 Both types of economic incentives share a feature 
that has been underappreciated: they take effect immediately and 
incentivize polluters to look for ways to change their practices to reduce 
their pollution, thereby reducing their costs. This feature is particularly 
important in light of the long delays in implementing actual pollution 
reductions.156 On the other hand, it is arguable that traditional 
command-and-control regulation, at least with judicial review, creates 
perverse incentives to try to delay for as long as possible the “day of 
reckoning” when one must actually spend money to install pollution-
control equipment. One wonders whether, if the Nixon Administration’s 
sulfur oxides tax has been enacted, it would have taken fifty years to 
reduce interstate pollution of sulfur oxides. The example of the acid 
rain-trading program, while admittedly not directly on point, suggests 
but does not prove that economic incentives, if set at a reasonable level, 
might well have reduced pollution more rapidly and more efficiently 
than traditional command-and-control rulemaking. 
To some extent, the EPA’s reluctance to impose emissions fees as 
well as command-and-control limits on pollution arose from an 
unfortunate legal opinion that I wrote in 1990 when I was the EPA’s 
General Counsel.157 The opinion expressed doubt about whether the 
EPA could collect pollution fees without running afoul of the general 
prohibition against agencies “supplement[ing] appropriations” without 
the specific authority to do so from Congress.158 Unfortunately, at the 
time, I was ignorant of the 1952 Independent Offices Appropriation 
Act,159 which gives all executive branch agencies, including the EPA, 
the authority to charge “user fee[s] . . . for a service or product whose 
distribution it controls.”160 I have recently attempted to correct my 
 
Gorman, & Barry Solomon, The Origins and Practice of Emissions 
Trading, 14 J. Pol’y Hist. 293 (2002) (outlining the move from theory 
to practice in using economic incentives in environmental law). 
155. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 Canadian J. 
Econ. 512 (1973), reprinted in Benefit-Cost and Policy Analysis 
1974 (Richard Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1975). 
156. See supra Part II.B (giving examples of environmental policies that 
endured extensive delays before enforcement). 
157. Elliott, supra note 12, app. at 10,923.  
158. Id.  
159. Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877, 1051 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b) 
(2012)). 
160. Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 795, 800 (1987); see also Nat’l 
Cable Television Ass’n, 415 U.S. 336, 340–41 (1974) (noting that the 
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unfortunate error by pointing out that the EPA does have general 
authority to impose user fees for allowing polluters to dispose of 
residuals from their production processes into the public’s air.161 
But the causes of the EPA’s unwillingness to impose fees for using 
the public’s air for waste-disposal purposes go deeper into the agency’s 
culture and expertise than just one erroneous legal opinion regarding 
its legal authority to do so. Bureaucrats who are used to establishing 
legal rules that require tangible add-on pollution-control equipment 
have more faith in that approach than in the invisible hand of the 
market. Even when Congress enacted in 1990 a mandatory requirement 
for a charge on emissions in addition to other measures in severely 
polluted nonattainment areas,162 the EPA declined to implement it. 
Although the law requiring emissions charges in severe nonattainment 
areas was on the books, according to someone who was there—Rob 
Brenner, who was the head of EPA’s influential Office of Air Policy and 
Program Support at the time—the EPA could never muster the 
“necessary political support” to enforce it.163 In fairness, by that time it 
was increasingly clear that many nonattainment problems were caused 
not by local polluters or recalcitrant local officials, but by pollution 
coming in from upwind states.164 Imposing additional financial charges 
on major industries in nonattainment areas in the New England and 
the Mid-Atlantic states would have done nothing to reduce pollution 
blowing in from the Midwest, for example. 
Fourteen years after enacting the emissions-fee-requirement, the 
EPA purported to “waive” that fee for emissions charges in severely 
polluted non-attainment areas,165 but it was sued and ordered to comply 
with the law.166 Since that time, the EPA has grudgingly applied the 
law, while still trying to give states as much flexibility as it can to 
 
regulatory scheme imposed by Congress was meant to benefit the public); 
Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 
335 (2003) (analyzing constitutional restraints on how taxes and fee 
structures can be applied); Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge 
of Pricing Externalities Under State Law, 97 Neb. L. Rev. 168 (2018) 
(discussing similar issues under state law). 
161. Elliott, supra note 12; see also Torres, supra note 152 (arguing that air 
resources are held in trust for the public which should benefit from their 
use). 
162. Clean Air Act § 185, 42 U.S.C. § 7511d (2012). 
163. Personal communication. 
164. See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text (describing the pollution 
from upwind states). 
165. 69 Fed. Reg. 23,951 (Apr. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 50, 51, 
and 81). 
166. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 905 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
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disregard that part of the law through “an equivalent alternative 
program” such as requiring more low-emission vehicles rather than 
imposing emissions charges.167 
Perhaps the larger lesson is that emissions charges in addition to 
command-and-control regulation are unlikely to be acceptable 
politically. That may also be the lesson from the use of the “cap and 
tax” epithet to kill the Waxman–Markey bill.168 So the political problem 
is how to make emissions charges into a “win-win.” How about offering 
polluters a choice: if they can figure out a way to reduce their pollution 
below what they are permitted to emit under existing command-and-
control regulation, they can opt out of the present system, provided 
that they pay emissions charges on whatever pollution they continue to 
emit? That is a policy that might just appeal to both environmentalists 
and the Trump Administration because it results in lower emissions as 
well as cutting bureaucratic red tape. 
Conclusion 
One hundred years ago, the prophet of today’s regulatory approach, 
James Landis, was a young professor of legislation at Harvard Law 
School. Landis wondered aloud why “admirable intentions of 
legislation” often ended with “perverse results.”169 His answer was that 
flaws in carrying out policy were due to legislation being implemented 
by generalist judges and legislatures who did not understand the 
specifics of the areas they were trying to regulate, but instead relied too 
much on formal rules.170 Landis’s fix was the creation of “the 
administrative,” governmental specialists who understood the area to 
be regulated by virtue of continuity and expertise.171 The current 
administrative state in general, and the EPA’s air program in 
particular, are the culmination of Landis’s vision of regulation imple–
mented by experts. 
A candid assessment would acknowledge that the EPA’s effort to 
regulate air pollution has made definite progress toward cleaning up the 
 
167. Memorandum from Stephen Page, supra note 14.   
168. See John M. Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy 
of Choice, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
 03/26/science/earth/26climate.html [https://perma.cc/6YSC-BLL6] 
(quoting Myron Ebell of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a leading 
adviser to President Trump and head of his 2017 EPA transition team, 
as saying “[w]e turned [cap and trade] into ‘cap and tax,’ and we turned 
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air during its fifty-year history. In this sense, it is definitely at least a 
qualified success. But at the same time, the inability of the EPA’s air 
program to address GHGs effectively over a generation or more is an 
obvious shortcoming. Even at its best, regulation of air pollution has 
been slow, cumbersome, and expensive. It often takes twenty-five years 
or more to accomplish even modest goals, and according to the EPA, 
after fifty years, one-third of the population of the country still lives in 
areas where the air violates national air quality standards.172 
Most of the shortcomings of the air program are due to its exclusive 
reliance on the method of “legalistic bureaucracy,” primarily notice-
and-comment rulemaking followed by judicial review and case-by-case 
enforcement. But regulation of air pollution has also been hamstrung 
by a lack of consistent political support, which has rarely been 
forthcoming as administrations come and go and political support 
fluctuates.173 
Like Landis, it is time to ask whether we can do better, and if so, 
how. This Article argues that emissions fees imposed by a bureaucracy 
that does not have to stand for reelection every two years would be 
better able to achieve the environmental progress that we all seem to 
want in the abstract but sometimes resist when it comes to specifics. 
One of the key functions of the administrative state is to do the things 
that need to be done but cannot muster a majority in a popularly 
elected legislature. The difficulty in getting sensible policies adopted 
often results because the “losers” from any particular pollution-control 
policy are concentrated and willing to invest a lot to stop it, whereas 
the beneficiaries are diffuse and have less at stake on any particular 
initiative.174 
It is time to move beyond the legal fiction that the administrative 
state is merely executing instructions from Congress. In fact, Congress 
often delegates decisions to the administrative state to “do the right 
thing” precisely because Congress cannot, either because it does not 
know enough, or because Congress needs the deniability that comes 
from being able to blame the bureaucracy.175 
 
172. See supra note 16 (explaining how the U.S. population is currently 
situated). 
173. See Elliott, supra note 66 (describing the causes of lack of bipartisan 
support for expanding environmental regulation since the 1992 election). 
 
174. See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell 
J. Econ. 3 (1971) (discussing how concentrated minorities may win out 
politically over majorities with less at stake). 
175. See David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How 
Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993; 1995 
paperback) (discussing how Congress avoids responsibility by delegating 
decisions to administrative agencies). 
